



Antibiotic resistance during and beyond COVID-19 3 
David M Livermore* 4 
Norwich Medical School, University of East Anglia, Norwich, Norfolk NR4 7TJ 5 
 6 
Running head:  AMR beyond COVID-19 7 
 8 
*Correspondence address.  9 
Norwich Medical School 10 
Floor 2, Bob Champion Research and Educational Building 11 
James Watson Road,  12 
University of East Anglia,  13 
Norwich Research Park,  14 
Norwich NR4 7UQ 15 
 16 
d.livermore@uea.ac.uk 17 





The modern medical era began around 1937-42, as systemic sulphonamides and 22 
penicillin mitigated the hazard of bacterial infection, opening medical and surgical 23 
possibilities that were previously unthinkable.   24 
Antibiotics remain the bedrock of what followed: complex surgery, intensive 25 
care, transplants and immunosuppressive treatments would be impossible if infection 26 
could not be controlled. In the community pneumococcal pneumonia still kills the 27 
debilitated, but no longer threatens the likes of Jane Austen’s Marianne Dashwood.  28 
Along with earlier improvements in public health, modern medicine has made early 29 
non-violent death rare in advanced societies. Mean, median and modal life 30 
expectancies have converged (fig 1) then extended.1  The caveat is that late-life years 31 
of ill health have extended too,2 giving a growing frail-elderly population with chronic 32 
illness and cognitive decline, particularly in Europe, North American and East Asia.3 33 
These are the frequent victims of opportunist Gram-negative bacteria, with 34 
accumulating resistance (fig 2).4     35 
Until 2020 this edifice grew without major viral challenge. Influenza pandemics 36 
in 1958/9 and 1968/9 killed many but were terminated by a mixture of strain ‘burn-out’ 37 
and vaccination.5 HIV took a grim toll but was largely avoidable by personal conduct, 38 
and now is medically manageable. SARS-CoV2 has changed the dynamic, whether 39 
temporarily or more permanently. 40 
 41 
A brief history of COVID-19 42 
First reports of COVID-19 seeped from Wuhan late in 2019, with the causative 43 
coronavirus SARS-CoV2 putatively having jumped from bats in a ‘seafood’ market.  44 
  
Laboratory escape is plausible too, as Wuhan hosts centres for coronavirus research, 45 
but is hotly disputed.6 46 
During January to February 2020, outbreaks occurred in China.  By 47 
February/March infection was spreading in Iran, then Europe.  The US was hit next, 48 
with major outbreaks in the northeast, particularly New York and New Jersey.  49 
Extensive spread followed in the southern USA, Latin America and India.  The 50 
pandemic peaked in Northern Europe and the North Eastern US in the early spring, 51 
with subsequent declines in infections, hospitalisations and deaths through the late 52 
spring and summer before a resurgence in the northern autumn and winter. Argentina, 53 
with the seasons reversed showed the converse pattern, with peak deaths in October, 54 
at the end of the southern winter.  With some exceptions, including a current (January 55 
2020) upsurge in South Africa, these patterns broadly support the view that SARS-56 
CoV2 is transitioning from being a ‘new pandemic virus’ to an ‘endemic winter 57 
respiratory virus’, joining the four long-established coronaviruses (229E, OC43, NL63 58 
and HKU1) that account for 10-20% of common colds.7  A few countries, notably 59 
Taiwan, Australia and New Zealand have largely isolated themselves from the 60 
pandemic by a combination of entry restrictions and strict containment efforts 61 
whenever small clusters have been detected. Central Africa has been little affected.   62 
 Like other single-stranded RNA viruses, SARS-CoV2 is highly mutable, with 63 
over 20000 sequence variants described. There is current concern about particular 64 
variants, including types that first circulated extensively in the UK (VUI202012/01 or 65 
B1.1.1.7), South Africa (1.351) and Brazil (P1).  These appear to spread more 66 
efficiently and, in some cases, may lack vaccine-relevant epitopes (see below); there 67 
is no substantiated data to indicate that they are more lethal.8  68 
  
 Most COVID-19 infection is mild, inconsequential and self-limiting.   Many only 69 
learn that they have been infected when they are found seropositive.  Even when virus 70 
is found by RT-PCR, half record no symptoms.9 Among those who do develop 71 
symptoms – predominantly fever, cough, and shortness of breath along with loss of 72 
taste and smell – recovery generally follows after one week.  But, for a minority, 73 
pulmonary symptoms worsen, necessitating hospitalisation and, in extremis, 74 
supplementary oxygen or ventilation.10, 11 Death occurs in 40-50% for ICU cases,12 75 
increasing with age, male gender, obesity, dementia, diabetes, cardiovascular or 76 
pulmonary disease.13   77 
Estimation of fatality rates is fraught, since most mild infections pass 78 
unrecorded.  In October 2020 the WHO suggested that c. 10% of the world’s 79 
population had been infected,14 and that deaths attributed to COVID-19 had then 80 
reached 1 million.  This indicated an infection fatality rate of around 0.13%. Ioannidis,15 81 
using seroprevalence data as the denominator, estimated 0.15-0.2%. These statistics 82 
are reassuring but carry four caveats: (i) the proportion is significantly higher in 83 
countries with a large elderly population, (ii)  sufficient severe cases can arise to 84 
overwhelm local or national ICU capacity, again especially if there is a large vulnerable 85 
elderly population;16 (iii) outbreaks in elderly-care facilities can kill extensively, as in 86 
the UK, Sweden, New York, Italy and Spain 17, 18, 19 and (iv) even low mortality rates 87 
translate to numerous deaths in large populations.  The aspects have dominated 88 
political debate, media coverage, and policy response. As of this writing (January 89 
2021) the UK NHS has around one third of its beds occupied by patients infected with 90 
SARS-CoV2, including more than half of its ICU beds, and is clearly showing stresses, 91 
emphasised in news bulletins.  Review of actual numbers gives a different perspective. 92 
From a UK population of 67m, roughly 1.1m (2%) were estimated to be infected with 93 
  
SARS-CoV2 in early January,20 and just 3000 – one citizen in 22000 – was sufficiently 94 
sick to need ICU care.  The central issue is a shortage of ICU beds for the minority 95 
who become severely ill, and staff to support them, not that COVID has a high fatality 96 
rate.  97 
Most governments across Europe, north America and South America have 98 
enacted repeated ‘lockdowns’, closing the economy, confining populations and 99 
mandating social distancing.  Reductions in deaths are attributed to these actions in 100 
China (strict lockdown), Europe and New York (varying strictness).21 There is, 101 
however, considerable scope for scepticism.  In the initial spring wave, UK deaths 102 
peaked on 8 April,22 whereas lockdown began on 23 Mar, suggesting that new 103 
infections were already declining, assuming >19 days from infection to death (5-6 days 104 
incubation, >8 to hospitalisation, >6 to death). Moreover, there is a remarkable 105 
similarity between the spring trajectories of death rates per million population between 106 
France, with a strict lockdown, the UK, with a less severe lockdown and Sweden, 107 
which no lockdown beyond general advice of social distancing and restrictions on large 108 
events and bar counter service.  The likely explanation is that viral seasonality 109 
underpinned the declines in each country. In an extensive analysis, De 110 
Larochelambert23  et al. reviewed deaths against lockdown stringency for 160 111 
countries, finding little relationship and concluding that death rates largely reflecting 112 
whether a country was in the temperate zone, typically had few deaths due to 113 
communicable diseases, and had a large elderly population for whom life expectancy 114 
was no longer extending.  Strict lockdowns in seven Danish counties, enacted 115 
following discovery of a new variant in mink, had no greater effect than milder 116 
restrictions in four adjacent counties24; death and infection trajectories in North and 117 
South Dakota are almost superimposable, despite more extensive business closure 118 
  
restrictions (and mask mandates) in the former.  Lockdowns have only worked 119 
convincingly where they were enforced very strictly against outbreaks that were tiny 120 
in global terms, as in Melbourne, or where, as in China, they approximated to classical 121 
quarantine, by extracting and confining those found infected.   122 
 123 
Immediate impacts on antibiotic use and resistance 124 
Most non-hospitalised COVID-19 patients receive no antibiotics.  Antibiotics – typically 125 
those used for community acquired pneumonia (i.e. amoxicillin/clavulanate + 126 
macrolide; ceftriaxone + macrolide or levofloxacin) – are prescribed to hospitalised 127 
cases, though few have evidence of bacterial infection.25  Rawson et al. estimated that 128 
72% of hospitalized COVID-19 patients received antibiotics but only 8% had bacterial 129 
infection.26 Langford et al. published similar figures.27 This suggests poor stewardship. 130 
Others note that bacterial co-infection is rarer than in influenza 28 whilst a Swiss study 131 
found that ‘early’ antibiotics, before ICU transfer, had little benefit.29 Some hospitals 132 
initially administered hydroxychloroquine plus azithromycin against COVID-19 itself, 133 
though benefits, and their mechanism, are disputed and the therapy has fallen into 134 
disfavour. 30, 31 135 
 ICU COVID-19 patients are usually intubated and face the risk of ventilator-136 
associated pneumonia (VAP), involving the Enterobacterales, Staphylococcus aureus 137 
and non-fermenters typical of this infection.  Across 5 UK ICUs we found Klebsiella 138 
pneumoniae and K. aerogenes unusually prevalent in COVID-19 patients,32 whereas 139 
a single-hospital French study found an excess of non-fermenters.33 Ventilated 140 
COVID-19 patients often receive multiple antibiotic courses.  At the height of the 141 
pandemic, stewardship policies were overridden,26 with ICU capacity increased. A 142 
  
Spanish hospital reported increased antibiotic use.34 Such data lead to concern that 143 
resistance may proliferate in hospitals as a result of COVID-19 pressures, though with 144 
scant evidence that it has actually done so. 145 
Resistance drivers in the community may increase too. More general practice 146 
consultations are remote, and pre-COVID studies suggest that US community 147 
physicians are more willing to prescribe antibiotics when consulted online for children 148 
35, 36 though not for adults.37 Delivery of childhood vaccines has been disrupted,38 149 
potentially favouring resurgence of multi-resistant vaccine serotypes of Streptococcus 150 
pneumoniae. Disruption of tuberculosis treatments will promote recrudescence, 151 
resistance and transmission of resistant variants, potentially leading to future 152 
treatment difficulties, e.g. in India, where tuberculosis kills over 420,000 p.a., or around 153 
2.5-fold more than COVID-19 to date (January 2021)39. Dentists - long discouraged 154 
from antibiotic use - were reduced to the options of antibiotics, analgesics and 155 
extraction, with aerosol-generating procedures forbidden.40, 41 156 
However, countervailing forces apply.  First, much non-COVID hospital activity 157 
has ceased during peaks of COVID-19 activity.42 In some jurisdictions, particularly the 158 
USA, hospital staff were laid off.43 The complex patients who are most vulnerable to 159 
multi-resistant gram-negative bacteria were no longer hospitalised.  In the UK more 160 
people died at home and in care homes rather than in hospitals, where they likely 161 
would have received antibiotics.22 IV antibiotic use in English hospitals, as DDDs, was 162 
32% lower in April-May 2020 than in April-May 2019 (P. Howard, Leeds Teaching 163 
Hospitals NHS Trust, personal communication). Wholesale IV antibiotic shipments to 164 
US hospitals, as DDDs, declined 30.7% in the same comparison (A. Carr, Needham 165 
& Company LLC, personal 178 communication) with only 4/36 products showing 166 
increases.  These data suggest reduced use, though we cannot exclude distortions 167 
  
from stock management inside hospitals, and the decline was only 6.9% if the month 168 
of March was added to the comparisons.  A more recent report, covering January to 169 
November 2020 compared with January to November 2019 indicates reduction is unit 170 
sales of systemic antibiotics as follows: Spain, 2.1%, France 3.6%, Germany 9.3%, 171 
Italy 14% and the UK 14.5%.44 Reports of Escherichia coli bacteraemias to England’s 172 
mandatory surveillance declined markedly in 2020, running 13.4% below those for 173 
2019 in the July to September quarter.45 Since it is unlikely that E. coli bacteraemia 174 
have declined in reality, the likelihood is that many septic patients, who ordinarily 175 
would present to A&E, are failing to do so and are failing to receive iv antibiotic therapy.  176 
They may be represented among the persistently increased numbers of citizens 177 
presently dying at home rather than in hospitals.46 Changes in incidence are much 178 
less marked for bacteraemias involving pathogens that are mostly healthcare 179 
acquired, specifically K. pneumoniae and Pseudomonas aeruginosa. 180 
Second, ICU triage, as applied at the height of the pandemic,47, 48 militated 181 
against the ‘frequent flyer’ patients likely to be pre-colonised with multi-resistant 182 
opportunists, favouring hospital-naïve patients more likely to retain a susceptible flora.  183 
 Third, international travel has been dramatically curtailed, and this must reduce 184 
the transfer of resistance.   London private hospitals ordinarily admit patients from the 185 
Middle East, frequently already colonised with resistant Gram-negative opportunists.49 186 
This has stopped.  Travellers e.g. to India commonly become colonised by ESBL-187 
producing E. coli.50, 51 Again, such travel has essentially ceased.  Social distancing 188 
and travel restrictions reduce opportunities to catch and import ‘super gonorrhoea’;52, 189 
53 though closure of GUM clinics 54 will facilitate the spread of any already circulating 190 
and a study in Milan indicated no reduction in presentations, substantially among gay 191 
men, for acute syphilis and gonorrhoea in early 2020 compared with 2019.55 192 
  
 Social distancing and masks may impact community transmission of respiratory 193 
infections, reducing demand for antibiotics. The elderly often acquire pneumococci 194 
from grandchildren56 and will not do so if families cannot meet.  In Italy, discontinued 195 
medical monitoring of otitis-media-prone children led to reduced antimicrobial 196 
prescriptions in the late winter, without apparent harm.57 197 
A final aspect, of uncertain impact, is the COVID-directed use of Personal 198 
Protective Equipment (PPE). This might be expected to diminish cross-infection, but 199 
the inconvenience of changing between patients increased MRSA transmission in the 200 
2003 SARS outbreaks in Canada and Singapore. 58, 59 201 
 202 
What next? Possible scenarios 203 
There are several plausible futures.  These are set out below and their implications for 204 
resistance, summarised in Table 1, are then considered. There also are extreme 205 
possibilities, outlined briefly in the concluding paragraph of this paper. 206 
Vaccines directed against SARS-CoV2 (Table 2) have been developed at 207 
impressive speed. Based on interim analyses of ongoing trials, several have been 208 
given emergency use authorisations in multiple jurisdictions. Those in use in Europe 209 
and North America are ‘new-technology’ mRNA and adenovirus vector products 210 
targeting the SARS-CoV2 Spike protein, which is crucial to viral receptor binding; 211 
classical inactivated virus vaccines have been developed in China and are finding use 212 
in SE Asia, Latin America and the Middle East.  Deployment is most advanced in 213 
Israel, with most (>80%) of the population now vaccinated using the Pfizer BioNTech 214 
product. 215 
  
Although trial results are promising, considerable uncertainty remains. First, 216 
since use is based on interim trial analyses the duration of protection is unknown.  217 
Post-infection immune responses to the classical coronaviruses (229E, HKU1, NL63 218 
and OC43) fade swiftly, restoring vulnerability to infection, though this is generally 219 
mild.60 Infection-induced IgG to SARS-CoV2 declines rapidly too,61, 62 especially in 220 
asymptomatic cases, suggesting a similar risk, though clinically-manifest reinfections 221 
seem rare, perhaps owing to persistent T-cell-mediated immunity.63 Secondly, there 222 
is uncertainty about vaccine responses in the vulnerable elderly with ‘adaptive 223 
immunosenescence’.64  Thirdly, it is uncertain whether the vaccines will prevent 224 
infection or act to reduce severity and increase the asymptomatic fraction, leaving 225 
vaccinees as vectors of infection.  Last, some of the emerging virus variants have 226 
mutations affecting the spike protein, and it is uncertain whether the present vaccines 227 
will reliably cover all present and future variants.8 228 
The optimistic scenario is that vaccines overwhelmingly succeed, reducing the 229 
threat of SARS-CoV2 at least to that of seasonal influenza (which typically has 10000-230 
30000 attributed deaths annually in England),65 and that the public accept this 231 
situation, allowing a return to normality. At worst, in this scenario, an annual booster 232 
shot will be needed, particularly for the elderly and those caring for them and perhaps 233 
with some regular adaptation to prevalent variants, as with influenza vaccines.  234 
The pessimistic scenario is that vaccines provide only modest and brief 235 
protection, most probably owning to the proliferation of diverse Spike protein variants 236 
and or to general failure to protect the most vulnerable elderly.  Failure might also arise 237 
if the public, after a year of saturation propaganda, can be satisfied by nothing less 238 
than ‘Zero COVID’. 239 
  
Substantial vaccine failure (or politically uncontainable demands for complete 240 
suppression) could be met with indefinite restrictions on social interactions and 241 
extensive track and trace systems. Incoming travellers, including returning nationals, 242 
would require testing or quarantine; outgoing travellers would enter a dangerous world 243 
unless all countries follow this approach (which they are not doing). The strategy may 244 
be sustainable for a remote island, possibly New Zealand, but seems unfeasible in the 245 
long term for a trading nation, let alone for a Continental Union with free movement 246 
and variable national approaches to COVID-19.   247 
The alternative response to vaccine failure would be to accept that SARS-CoV2 248 
has become endemic and must circulate, potentially in the form of diversifying spike 249 
protein variants that facilitate reinfection. Repeated exposure, together with modestly 250 
protective vaccines, should progressively reduce disease severity, especially among 251 
the young, who would age with SARS-CoV2 as we all do with the four long-established 252 
coronaviruses. The difficulties with this model, are (i) how best to protect the present 253 
cohort of most-vulnerable elderly who lack both prior exposure and the ability to adapt, 254 
and (ii) how to re-educate a public that has been ‘trained’, by governments and media, 255 
to believe COVID-19 to be far more lethal than is actually the case.66   256 
There is one tantalising hint of how a future that accepted spread might unfold: 257 
the 1889-94 ‘Russian influenza’ pandemic.  This is conventionally attributed to H2N2 258 
or H3N8 influenza A,67, 68 based on the serology of elderly patients tested decades 259 
later.  An alternative hypothesis is that coronavirus OC43 was responsible, having 260 
evolved apart from a bovine coronavirus shortly beforehand.69 Like COVID-19 and 261 
unlike influenza, the 1889-94 infection selectively killed men, spared children 70 and 262 
caused loss of taste and smell.71 Unlike earlier influenza epidemics it gave repeating 263 
similarly-sized waves over 5 years, a point thought unusual at the time and which 264 
  
seems exceptional compared with any influenza epidemic in the preceding 200 years 265 
or the subsequent 130.72,73 Such a prolonged pandemic fits a model whereby prior 266 
exposure to other coronaviruses gives partial cross-protection, as now postulated for 267 
SARS-CoV2,74,75 but with cohorts regaining vulnerability as immune responses 268 
diminished, and perhaps experiencing more than one OC43 infection as immune-269 
escaping mutants were selected. This is speculation, but the parallels are intriguing.  270 
If correct and if predictive (two big ‘ifs’!), it implies that coevolution of man and 271 
virus may take half a decade to achieve equilibrium.  Even today OC43 can cause 272 
lethal care home outbreaks.76 273 
 274 
Implications of the scenarios for antibiotic usage and resistance 275 
1) Vaccine success.   276 
If vaccines prove overwhelmingly successful there should be a progressive, and 277 
increasingly exuberant return to the ‘Old normal’ in human behaviour and (assuming 278 
solvency) travel. Hospitals will face a backlog of elective procedures, along with 279 
patients who, fearful of nosocomial COVID-19, had postponed seeking healthcare; 280 
one analysis suggests that this backlog may amount to almost 5 million hospital 281 
treatment episodes in the UK alone.77  Some will have more severe disease, including 282 
more advanced cancers, than would ordinarily be the case.  Unless additional 283 
hospitals can be commissioned and (the greater challenge!), staffed, there will be 284 
considerable workload pressures, which are correlates of increased nosocomial 285 
infections,78 antibiotic use and resistance. In short, once healthcare and travel revert 286 
to full capacity, more resistance should be expected. 287 
  
 A partial counterpoise will be the numbers of previously heavy users of 288 
healthcare who succumbed to COVID or (because they could not access treatment in 289 
the COVID-dominated period) to other illnesses. UK excess mortality from March to 290 
June 2020 was 30% above normal, with half the deaths falling among care home 291 
residents.79 Their demise will reduce demand, but this balancing factor will be small 292 
when considered as a proportion: the UK has c.1.62m hospital admissions p.a. and a 293 
care home population of 400,000. It will generally be less elsewhere, for the UK had 294 
one of the heaviest COVID-19 tolls worldwide. 295 
2) Perceived vaccine ‘failure’: long-term trace and trace seeking ‘Zero COVID’.  296 
The aim here, following vaccine disappointments, would be to suppress COVID-19 297 
sufficiently that normality of a sort resumes within a closed system, as presently in 298 
Taiwan, Australia or New Zealand, all of which achieved early control of viral spread 299 
meaning that their hospitals are not under the pressures outlined above.  If successful, 300 
the medium-term implications for hospital antibiotic utilisation would resemble the 301 
vaccine case.   In the short term, the pressures would be rather different and would 302 
continue to resemble those that have pertained in the pandemic itself, both in respect 303 
of hospital workload being dominated by COVID and by reduced hospital capacity 304 
caused by the needs (i) to socially distance beds, (ii) to cohort patients according to 305 
COVID status, and (iii) for numerous staff to self-isolate following track and trace 306 
alerts.  These factors may drive a shift to out-patient antibiotic therapy and long-307 
dosage-interval antibiotics, before the rise in use, selection pressure and bacterial 308 
cross infection that will occur once COVID-19 comes under control hospitals move to 309 
clear their backlog.  Such a model must assume drastic long-term reductions in 310 
international travel, as it would not be feasible to allow free movement to and from 311 
  
countries lacking similarly stringency.  This would impede the trans-national flow of 312 
resistant bacteria.   313 
 The issues with this model are not its implications for antibiotic resistance, 314 
which are broadly positive, at least in the short term, but its feasibility and its 315 
sustainability.   Track and trace systems have, so far, only worked in countries where 316 
COVID-19 gained little initial traction, not those, such as the UK, USA and the EU 317 
states, where the virus has become endemic and prevalent. In these latter polities, 318 
track and trace has been overwhelmed or confounded by undetected cases, spurious 319 
late positivity in recovered patients,80 poor concordance between repeat tests81 and 320 
poor agreement between different types of test.82 Once infection rates are low, false 321 
positives are apt to outnumber true positives, even for a test with e.g. 99% specificity, 322 
reducing the positive predictive value.83 The failure of track and trace is illustrated by 323 
the extent to which governments have resorted to reported lockdowns that they had 324 
sworn, after Spring 2020, to eschew. 325 
   In the view of this author, vaccines would have to come close to being 326 
successful, reducing disease prevalence, before the approach becomes practicable. 327 
And, if these conditions pertain, it becomes disproportionate to prioritise COVID-19 328 
compared with other infections, notably influenza, that remain significant causes of 329 
death in the same demographic.  What is more, the economic and social costs will 330 
mount as other countries, eschewing this approach, abandon restrictions and their 331 
contingent costs.  Closed defensive economies rarely prosper.   These issues, albeit 332 
without the issues of healthcare backlog, will have to be faced also by those countries 333 
that have been most successful at suppressing COVID-19 during 2020: should they 334 
deploy a sub-optimal vaccine, or should they remain closed? 335 
  
 336 
3) Vaccine ‘failure’: community control relaxed or abandoned.   337 
Given the massive ‘sunk cost,’ control abandonment is now likely only after multiple 338 
vaccine disappointments and as the social and economic cost of lockdowns becomes 339 
obvious and painful, even to those who presently believe in their efficacy and virtue.  340 
Further viral waves would then be anticipated, largest in countries that initially 341 
suppressed COVID-19 most effectively or, more randomly, in those where 342 
immunologically distinct variants emerge.   If the 1889-94 ‘Influenza’ is a model, spikes 343 
of infection might extend over years, extending pressure on hospitals.  Vaccines, whilst 344 
failing to prevent COVID-19, may mitigate severity and treatments will likely improve. 345 
Dexamethasone reduces mortality84 in severely-ill patients, and inhaled interferon- 346 
may reduce progression to severe disease.85 Clinical manageability may encourage 347 
governments to reduce suppression.  348 
Even so, hospitals will still be hazardous, or be seen as hazardous, extending 349 
pressure to use oral, OPAT and long T1/2 antibiotics.  Since this period will be longer 350 
than under other scenarios, there will be more impetus to develop such therapies.  351 
Single-dose iv oritavancin and dalbavancin give near-universal antistaphylococcal 352 
coverage, as do (multi-dose) oral oxazolidinones, delafloxacin and omadacycline.86 353 
Oral cephalosporin/-lactamase inhibitor combinations and (carba)penems – 354 
sulopenem and tebipenem -  are in development, 87, 88 targeting ESBL producers. 355 
Although sulopenem  has recently disappointed in cUTI, 89 it proved effective in uUTI,90 356 
whilst tebipenem was found to be as effective as ertapenem in cUTI.91 Of particular 357 
note are combinations of ceftibuten with the oral boronate QPX7728, which inhibits 358 
  
serine and metallo carbapenemase (except IMP types) as well as ESBLs and AmpC 359 
enzymes. 92 360 
 Gradually, normality will return.  And maybe sooner than the 1889-94 analogy 361 
suggests, given the boost that even partially effective vaccines may provide.  Public 362 
fear will subside as the huge excess of mild infection is better appreciated.  Hospitals, 363 
society and travel will revert to pre-pandemic patterns though after a disruption that 364 
may persist for several years.  365 
Ultimately all these models predict that COVID-19 will, more or less quickly, 366 
decline in importance and, as it does so, old concerns will re-emerge.  As Churchill 367 
observed after WW1: 368 
 369 
"The position of countries has been violently altered. The modes of thought of 370 
men, the whole outlook on affairs, the grouping of parties, all have encountered 371 
violent and tremendous change...  But as the deluge subsides and the waters fall 372 
short, we see the dreary steeples of Fermanagh and Tyrone emerging... The 373 
integrity of their quarrel is one of the few institutions unaltered in the cataclysm"93 374 
 375 
And, in the present context, multi-resistant Gram-negatives will renew their challenge.  376 
Those seeking a review of prevalent types are directed to the article by Bush and 377 
Bradford,94 those wishing to appreciate differing threats of ‘carbapenem’ resistant and 378 
carbapenemase-producing, to our own publication.95  Figure 4 of the present paper 379 
summarises the activity of recently licensed agents against important resistance types, 380 
noting where there is demonstrated clinical evidence of efficacy. 381 
  
Conclusions 382 
COVID-19 is not a great historical pandemic.  During 2020 it was reportedly involved 383 
in around 1.8m (3%) of the 60m deaths that occurred worldwide and the world 384 
population rose by 80m.96 The 1347-50 Black Death, for comparison, reduced the 385 
European population by 33-60%, with recovery taking 150 years.  On 29 Sept 1918 386 
the troopship SS Leviathan cleared New York with 11800 aboard.  When she docked 387 
at Brest 10 days later, 2000 were sick with influenza, 1000 were stretchered ashore 388 
and 80 were dead; 15 more died in France.97 A COVID-19 outbreak on the USS 389 
Theodore Roosevelt infected at least 1200 from a complement of 4000.98 One died. 390 
The 1889-94 pandemic killed 125000 in the UK, 27000 in its 1889-90 wave. This was 391 
from a population of 33 million, or around half of today.  Some social scientists blame 392 
the influenza for fin de siècle angst,99,100 but life continued. Gilbert and Sullivan’s 393 
Gondoliers opened on 7 Dec 1889, days before the first case, playing continuously 394 
until April 1891. Prince Eddy – second in line to the throne – succumbed on 14 Jan 395 
1892, Lady Windermere’s Fan opened in the February.  In October 1918, the Allies’ 396 
‘100 Days Campaign’ crept bloodily eastwards, defeating the German army as the 397 
pandemic peaked.101,102 Across the lines, Berlin alone recorded 1700 influenza deaths 398 
on 18 October,103 but retained sufficient energy for street revolution to erupt in 399 
November.104  Our forebears, lacking virology, would have mistaken 2020 for a ‘bad 400 
flu year’, mourned their dead, but carried on. 401 
 Where COVID-19 is unique is in hitting a modern medicalised population with 402 
many elderly and vulnerable, and in humanity’s reaction.  Never before was it policy 403 
to shutter the economy or to confine the healthy.  The WHO’s Pandemic Influenza 404 
Plan of 2019 makes no mention of lockdown as a strategy105 and the approach was 405 
expressly dismissed in the 1957 influenza pandemic.106, 107 406 
  
It will be for future historians to assess the wisdom or folly of the policies 407 
adopted in 2020-21, but it is already arguable that our response generated more harm 408 
than the epidemic, leading to impoverishment, delayed treatment and increased 409 
mortality for other (e.g. cardiovascular) conditions, disrupted educations, and mental 410 
illness.108, 109, 110, 111 A particularly extensive review of the harms of lockdown is 411 
provided by Joffe.112 Many ‘saved’ by lockdowns had little time to live: someone 412 
entering a care home in the UK ‘expects’ c. 30 months, and care home residents 413 
account for half the UK deaths.113  Those whose prospects are blighted by the 414 
response to COVID-19 span the age spectrum.  Unless vaccination is successful, or 415 
societies are prepared to accept indefinite and stultifying restrictions on liberty, the 416 
epidemic must ultimately run its course.  417 
 Against this ‘big picture’, effects on antibiotic resistance are a sideshow.  Sharp 418 
reductions in COVID-unrelated medicine, IV antibiotic use and travel are reducing 419 
short-term selection pressure nationally, though perhaps increasing it in stressed 420 
ICUs.  The longer effects depend on the success of vaccines or, if they fail, on the 421 
response to this failure.  If vaccines succeed overwhelmingly, a hectic period will follow 422 
as hospitals address a backlog, with some patients sicker than had they been treated 423 
earlier.  Resulting pressures will promote resistance.  If vaccines fail, or if unrealistic 424 
hopes lead to a perception of failure, a more atomised society will persist.  This will 425 
favour oral, OPAT and long T1/2 antibiotics, reducing hospital-centred selection and 426 
cross-infection.  Travel will be reduced, limiting import of resistance.  But such an 427 
approach is unsustainable except in an island choosing indefinite isolation.  The 428 
dénouement, sooner or later, will be relaxation, further COVID-19 waves, perhaps by 429 
vaccine-evading variants, then recovery and normalisation.  430 
  
 Some shifts seem set to be maintained, notably more home working, which 431 
may reduce circulation of other respiratory infections and the contingent, often 432 
unwarranted, community demand for antibiotics.  In hospitals, all ‘likely’ scenarios 433 
favour a short-term reduction in resistance selection, then a bounce-back. Ultimately, 434 
old challenges will renew, including with carbapenemase producers.  Newer 435 
antibiotics, including cefiderocol, address these.  436 
 Last, there are extreme futures, where economic damage arising from 437 
lockdowns or failure of the ‘modern monetary theory’ used to finance COVID-19 438 
responses precipitates civil unrest, loss of confidence and a flight to gold. The Lebanon 439 
– already in political turmoil in 2019 – exemplifies COVID-19 tipping a precarious 440 
situation over the edge. During 2020 the Lira fell 85% on the dollar, inflation hit 50% 441 
monthly and the government was unable to pay healthcare providers. Hospitals 442 
suffered blackouts. An early ‘total shutdown’ was followed by an accelerating case 443 
tally 114, 115 and a further shutdown, though it was hard to see how this could be 444 
financed, or a good outcome achieved, even without the devastating explosion of 4 445 
Aug.116  Experience in Libya and Syria show that carbapenemase-producing bacteria 446 
can proliferate in times of chaos.117, 118 The inability of a bankrupt Argentina to pay for 447 
antibiotics in 2003 was associated, briefly, with reduced use119 though also with worse 448 
outcomes for non-infectious conditions,120 and increased mortality in infections.121  449 
If future society is to prosper and to be able to afford modern medicine, it is vital 450 
that we avoid such futures, for their human cost will greatly exceed than any toll arising 451 
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Table 1. Implications of different scenarios for resistance.  902 
Arrows indicate predicted change in selection pressure from the pre-COVID-19 situation: Upward, increased selection pressure; horizontal, reversion to 903 
status quo ante; downward, reduced selection pressure. 904 
Scenario Central prediction on 
COVID-19 
Sustainable Push towards more treatment 
in the community with oral, 
OPAT and long T1/2 agents 
Surge of hospital 
activity to clear 
backlog 




perceived as such 
 
Burden no greater than 




Brief: until population vaccinated Early 
 
 
Briefly reduced, then 
normalised 
Vaccine failure or 
perceived failure. 
Prolonged emphasis on 
track and trace 
Control requires eternal 
vigilance but is achieved 
and maintained 
Doubtful 
Brief (if successful): until COVID 
reduced to low incidence 
Early (if suppression 
successful) 
Reduced for prolonged 
period 
Vaccine failure. 
Acceptance that virus is 
established, endemic 
and that lockdowns are 




waves, ending in herd 
immunity; significant 
further direct mortality 
Yes 
Extended: until population 
immunity dominates 
Delayed  Steady reversion to 
normality 
  
Table 2. Vaccines against SARS-CoV2 905 
Vaccine Manufacturer Type Efficacy Notes Reference 
BNT162b2 Pfizer BioNTech mRNA 95%  AA122 
mRNA-1273 Moderna mRNA 94.1%  BB123 
Sputnik Gamaleya Institute Adenovirus vector 91.4%  CC124 
ChAdOx1nCoV-19 AstraZeneca/Oxford 
University 
Adenovirus vector 53.4%-90.0% Efficacy varied with 
subgroup, dosage 




Sinopharma Inactivated virus 79-86%  XX126 
CoronaVac Sinovac Inactivated virus 50.4%  YY127 




Figure 1. Three measures of changing lifespan for men in the UK. Data Source: Office for National Statistics.1 LE means life expectancy. Patterns for women 909 














1841 1861 1881 1901 1921 1941 1961 1981 2001














































Figure 3. First wave deaths from COVID-19, France (strict lockdown; 13.8% Q2 fall in GDP), UK (moderate lockdown; 20.4% Q2 fall in GDP) and Sweden (no 920 

















































Figure 4. Activity of recently licensed (USA and EU/UK) agents against problem groups of Gram-negative bacteria 923 
 
Enterobacterales Pseudomonas Acinetobacter 
OXA 
ESBL AmpC KPC OXA-48 MBL Efflux AmpC MBL 
Ceftolozane/tazobactam a     
b b 
  
Ceftazidime/avibactam c  
d d 
     
Meropenem/vaborbactam   
e 
      
Imipenem/relebactam       
f 
  
Plazomicin (US)g     
h 
    
Eravacycline (US)i          




a) Trial evidence of efficacy 128 
b) In use evidence of clinical activity against P. aeruginosa likely, based on phenotypes, to have these mechanisms 129 
c) Trial evidence of efficacy 130 
d) In use evidence of efficacy and of better outcomes than colistin combinations 131,132 
e) Trial evidence of better outcomes than colistin combinations 133 
f) Trial evidence of activity against imipenem-resistant P. aeruginosa, likely to have owed their phenotypes to combination of loss of porin 
OprD and expression of AmpC 134 
g) Licensing application withdrawn in EU 
h) Many isolates with NDM carbapenemases co-produce ArmA or RmtB 16S rRNA methyltransferases, conferring resistance 135 
i) Good in-vitro activity against carbapenemase-producing Enterobacterales, but trial failures in cUTI 136 
j) Trial evidence of activity 137 
k) MICs raised for isolates with NDM carbapenemase compared with those for isolates with other carbapenemases; the proportion of these 
count as resistant will depend on breakpoints used 138 
l) In vitro activity, but excess mortality in CREDIBLE-CR study, compared with colistin combinations, associated with A. baumannii, 
suggesting need for caution.139 
  924 
  
Colour coding: Green, widely active (>90%); orange, variably active (50-90%); red, rarely (<50%) or never active. 925 
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